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Governing the New Europe : The European Union at the Crossroad
Toshiro KURODA
  What is to be the basis for order in post-Cold War
Eurepe? Seven years after the fall of Berlin VLrall,
the answer to this question is still unclear. The
visions of a "return to Europe", a Europe"free and
whole", and a"European peace order" have notbeen
fulfilled.i The bipelar structure of Cold War Europe
has given way not to a unified system of democratic
states, but rather to 'a system with regional differ-
ences. It is possible to identify four broad regions
which have similar constellations of political and
economic patterns : Western Europe, Central and
Eastern Europe, the Bail{ans and the European
states of the former Soviet Union. Aithough tliey no
Ionger take an ideologlcal forrn, they are again
coming to influence patterns ef conflict and cooper-
ation among nations. It is an open question whether
the very different politles and societles in these
regions can be brought together into an effective
common politicai framework. How far will these
differences inhibit- the development of a common
politicalL frarnework in Europe? XVill the drive
tewards economic and political integration in -Sjlrest-
ern Europe contribute.to the building of such a Pan-
European po!itical architecture?2
I
  The European Union (EU) may be defined a$ a
strong, indeed unique, international regime,3 Inter-
natienal regimes can support cooperation by in-
stituionalizing coordinated behaviour, by shaping
expectations, and by establishing rules and reward-
ing cempliance with them. International regimes
may'so succeed in embedding cooperation that they
affect their members' perception of their oxvn
national interests and create overriding commoji
interests, Integr'ation is a method ef institutionaliz-
ing cooperation which can reinforce expectations of
complicance and offer incentives for striking suc-
ssful bargains and agyeeing policies. NeQ-liberal
instituti nalists a gu  that given reasonably com-
patible lnterests, institutions can sustain coopera-
tion and Iimit confiicts, They also emphasize a
process of intemat alization of policy'making,
driven by the need for states to coodinate policy
actions in order to be effective : this is Iinked to the
development of relatively consensual decision-mak-
ing prac ices and shared interests, which appear
strong enough to override conflicts; Western Eur-
opean societies have very high levels of interdepen-
denc , cr a ed by thei  trading links, cross-border
investment and eommon institutionS tirrough'multi-
ple integration processes. Together with the sense
of c mmunity tha  has developed out of shared
cultural and political values, these links have creat-
ed both an economic community and a pTuralistic
security comrnunity (in Karl Deutsch's sense, a
group of s cieties that have !ost the fear of fighting
one another).
  With the changes introcluced by the Single Eur-
opean Act and the Maastricht Treaty, it seeius tliat
the EU has certain institutional features which go
far beyond any other international regime and that
we are facing a mixture of intergovernmental aiid
federai organizations. European integration has
be n a ve y original attempt at peoling andifor
ble ding sovereign powers, and it aiso created cen-
tral author'ities that could exert powers transfenLed
tu theni by the nie!nber $tates in a ntmiber of lnipor-
tant areas: agricultttre, external trade, competition
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po]icies, and so on. The clecision in principle taken
at Maastricht in December l991, to move towards a
common currency, a common foreign policy and
possibly ati tiltimate defence policy iclentity,
signified both a step towards political integration
and an attempt to strengthen the system of Western
European cooperation. The resulting structure dicl
not immediately alter the nature of the Western
European polity. Nation- states remained in charge.
Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty gave the
lmpress{on that a major step ftom national to su-
pranatioltal governance was taking place, How ean
we assess the ability of the EU to construct a future
European order ? Will Western European integra-
tion continue in its present form ? Is it feasible for
the Western European integration proCess to be
extended to Central and Eastern Europe and to
other countries of Northern and Southeastern
Europe?･i
  Stanley Hoffrnann oiice defined tl)e niain i$sqes
for political thinkers today as follows:
   IKTe are also (perhaps primarily) concemed
   with conditions of peace in international soci-
   ety, because the very institutien of the state -
   celebrated as the source of order, liberty, and
   morality fo'r citizens- has also 'turned out to be
    a source of internatienal chaos and consequeiSt-
    ly of physica! danger and moral agony. }Iow to
   be beth a good citizen of a nation and a good
    citizen of the werld ; hew to prevent the state
    from oppressing its subjects or from obliging
    them te behave' imniora!ly toward outsider$,
    ufider the pressure of international competition,
    without meanwhile destroying the bcnd ef loy-
    alty and sense of identity that link each citizen
    to his compatriots - these' have become the
    majer iSsues for political thinkers today.5
  Is it rea$enable that we expect a solution te such
a puz.zle from the EU? Will the EU be going furtlier
towards the ¢reatiQn of a European civii society,
that is, towards the alliance of civil republics whieh
Kant envisaged in his famous .i la?PeittaS Peace? Here
we must turn to the difficulties Western European
socie ies are facing in making of a European new
orcler.
                    Il
  The prevailing assumption in 1989190 was that a
c lm Western Europ , its own political and eco-
nomic habits well embedded, would provide the hub
und spolce mech nisms that woLild link the countries
of Centr l a d Eastern Europe to mainstream Eur-
ope. The five years si ce Maastricht, however, have
challenged bo h the p vious belief that the victori-
ous western powers retained control over events,
atid the earlier optimism rnentioned above, The
seritis ef unanticipat d and disturbing events that
have shaken Western Europe's confidence: the coi-
lapse of the Sovie  Union "and the subsequent mili-
tary conflicts along its southern and eastern bor-
ders; inereasingly severe political conflict in Russia
its lf; dlff cult e  with German unificatien; narrow
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and monetary
crises in Europe; and the undeterred and un-
controlled war i  th  fermer Yugoslavia.
  The most mportant challege to a European new
order is the place of ethnic minorities in Cefltral and
Easte n European states ---difficulties in relations
between mi ority and majority cemmunities, Given
the prevailing cliina e of nationalism, demands for
secessioii, dr for greater states bringing together
dispersed groupes, have been powerful. The prob-
Iem f ethnic minorities combines with the dubiouS
l gitimacy f new state boundaries and opens the
iss"e f re rawiiig f ontiers. Issues of identity and
state legitimacy combined with aggressive national-
ism are "ewhere more evldent than in the Balkans,
 If peace comes to Bos!iia, it will be tempting to
conclude that ethnic cleansing -the creation of
hemogeneous poPulations by nieans of mass exile-
has, in its murdereus way, worked. Mere than
2 million pe ple have been remeved from areas in
which they were aften, but nat aiways, minorities.
Many tens of th u$ands have been killed before they
had a chance to niev . The human constituents of
"Bosnia -Serbs, Creats, Mttslims- will in the end be
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largely separated. Many will be swallowed up by
the neighbouring states to which they give loyalty
on ethnic grounds, An indigestible little rump of
multi-fibred Bosnian flesh will be left in the middle.
The harmonious, secular -Bosnia-Hercegovlna is
dead. Peace seems to come only with dismember-
rnent and the enforcement of a greater degree of
ethnic homogeneity.
  One response to the ethnic problems in a nationa!
democracy is to ignore them -to refuse to recog-
nise group rights and to treat each cit!zen equally
before the ]aw. Call this the melting-pot approach.
Another solution is to try anct protect group rights
through subtle constitutional design -often federal,
but not necessarily so. This may be called the
mosaic approach, Even the mosaic approach would
be able to function only when people share a certain
feeling of fellowship associated with a belief in
common ideal overarching ethnic differences, not to
speak of the former.
  Perhaps notably lacking in the Maastricht proc-
ess is an underlying common value set on a Eur-
opean scale. .This is why the EU could not effective-
ly prevent the breaking up of multi-ethnlc societies
in the Balkans. Western European integration has
been implemented On the assumption that one can
distinguish the nation from the state whose powers
are now shared with the EU. This distinction points
to a European state, but one witheut a European
nation, as there are still no Eurepean mass media,
parties, interest groups (except in business), or
public. The establishment of a common European
citizenship at Maastricht is only a formal first step,
Without such a European nation, many feel, so to
speak, denuded, for the nation-state is losing power,
but' the European vkTpuld-be state, uncornfortably
stracldling nations with dive$e traditions and inter-
ests, seems incapable'of defining a common policy
 in vital matters such as defense and diplomacy, as
 the failure in Yugoslavia show$,
m
  The distinctien between the nation and the state
in European integration is closely related to the
recent debate on sovereignty in France, which
domina ed the campaign over the ratificatien of the
Maastricht Treaty in the spring and summer of
1992.6 Fra ce's Jacobin and Republican tradition
vsTas evoked'especially by the Gaullist Philippe
Seguin. T e arguments of a nurnber of Frenchmen
ppesing the Maastricht Treaty have a clearly
Rousseauistic ring; there is, at present, no European
nation, only v r ety of European nations that wish
to c op rat ; legitimate decisions among them can
be t ken only by the agents of the separate popular
wills; otherwise, the decisions would only represent
either the will of one of tho$e communities iMposed
on the others, or the will of technocrats --executive
agents operating in a political vacuum. -If we start
with this kind of Jacobinism that justifiably clairns
Rousseau as one of its prophets, then the on!y links
among sta es that do not conflict with it are confed-
                                 .erations, which may have common executive organs
appointed or instructed by the legi$lators, but in
which the legislators (i. e., the general wills) would
remain separate national entities, Association$ of
governrnents are possible, but not of peeples.
  In France, the s ate has been seen and embraced
as the source of rights and duties and as the founder
and guardian of the' ation. Its weakening and
replacem nt by a weak multinational psudo-super-
state only increases fears about national iclentity. It
is not surprising that many FrenchTnen find it diffi-
cult to identify with a Europe that remains a purely
e onom c and bureauc atic construction showing
few signs of becoming a nation. The frequent feroc-
it of the recent debate can be also explained by the
fact that, for many of the French, the defence of
Frenc soverei nty abroad has come to mean some-
thing more than the protection of French interests
from fereign encroachments, Now it means defend-
 ing France's very identity; the groxving sense that
 France's distinctiveness, France's nature, France's
 culture, are increasingly at stake in the interna-
 tional arena. Is it enough that political elites say,
 "Don't worry, XETe can take the initiative anytime
 anywhere," for the French to get rid of the feeling
 that the threat to "Frenchness" has increasingly
 been coming from abroad? Te be cynical, oiie might
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arg-u-e th-Ltt it is g. rh-cltorig a la frangaise without
sui)sta-i-i-cc, A.t the very least one shculd note that
l[J7-rep.ch. IT)Qli'tical parties have had. the difficLtlties in
reesteblishinx- an. attractive and credible leadership
iv-r wl).at tl)cy ca.ll the "Eurepeari project",'
??
  A-lt' l:-fi-ugh thg $e¢ond half of this es$ay tends te
fecus on. dile:mmas and li!T.i-itatioiis of European
ip.t/egratiQti, it is irnporta.nt here to be clear about
the pregre$$ E.uropean unity' has made. The E.ur-
epean- Uni-on is nor'[T a neeessRry and per!p-a--n.ent part
Q//' th-a -Eur'Qpea-fi' pelitical !andsca-pe. The spring-
ba-a.rd fc-)r a iuture Eu-roPe w.Quld be a sense that
being EgrQpefi-fi-- m--eaii-s- s.omething in itseli: some-
a2kin--g to d'o wS-th freed.Qm, selFreliaace, the rule Qf
la-w.-i di-e:i'gecra-cy and fellow feeling.S Se a final word
a--$fQllQwS: - '
   E.-ven- a--meng- EU tter!ibers, rhetor!ca! su-ppert
   for Eu.rQpean eeR$tvaetlQp- oitep- c-Qn-c-eals cen-
   slderable dl$agreem.-ep-t a-bqu.t the itature of the
   EurQpe ti-i-a--t- is- bel"g ¢ea$tructed. Typically
' m--efi-lb.et $ta-te$ loek tc a Europe in. theif a"nt
   ig.l-i-itTe: GermRny te a i'eder3-l E-urQpei Ftanee te
   s. Earepe w.ith a- s.tE=ang e-x'ecutlve based aR
   FseRek'ttQfin.s; tiic U- K te a iree-trading grog.p
   Qtt $Qlgefeign states. I¥{any west guropea.g$. a$$e-
   cla-te Evr'e-pe- with westeyR v3iu..e$ geing baeli te
. t-he- ERIi.ffIiteim].egt, w.h.i.cl}. tta.B.'S'cenS tiie parc-
   cikiallsm #g-d s]-?-t-io-pg-}lsLml-.-. ef'partleulay peoples
   fi-n--d st-a:t-es, ¥-gt e.a.tl'e'ftalism Rnd xencph.abla
   lj-a-v'e e-t leg$t a$ sgreRg a clai.g.i. te. eepfesent
   EusepeaR traditlag.s. A.gai"st lhe. ga?apeait val-
   ue$ et7 d.iv.ersity, te}.e?R"'ee. epei!i/ es$. Itumaa
   rlg-l}t$. and ?l'afalis-Ei-i caR l)e placed the u-Q leL$s
   illiifepeait expetlggeg at'-= ce!c-g}L!a--lisat.., gefiecide,
    3g-e- t-a-t-a-I w-.3-g- l.g- t-'b-e pQ$.t-Celi Way centext,
   fet"ettlg.tag- Eurepe is a stsrkgg!e over w}i-3-t Elef;
    epean e-ivili$g-{J i-eg- i-$ tQ fn. .e.an l?etl} ia lts tts'prira-
  ' tiens g-' g-e. i-a. ;tls. ?Q-l-}'il'ctt-I i.!!ttcklce.e
NOTES
l. The very copcept ef '`Europe" is new disputed.
  As Bo tli & Wheeler (1992, p.5) put it, "There
  i$ today much more to identifying `Europe' than
  looking on a map: politics is rnore important
  than geegraphy, How people choose to define
  Europe will have a significant impact on how
  Qiey think both abottt security in Europe and
 Eu pe's relations with the outside world, The
  c o en ciefinition will previde the basis ef the
  aRswer to the crucial question: who is ;us' and
 who is `them' politica!ly speakiRg? "For compet-
  ing visions of post-Cold War Europe, see Miall
   (1994).
2. Laur$ n (1993) js useful as an intreductery
  anaysis of the imp!ications ef VLrestern Eur-
   opeaz] lntegtatien in the broader development
   of Europe.
3. Fer competing hypotheses abeut the nature ef
  he in$titutions ef the El-i, see Andersen &
   Eliassen (l993), l〈eehaRe & }Ioffmami (1991),
  I!eohane & liaiimann 〈1993), Wallaee (Relen,
 199S), Wall.ace (William, 2996) .
4. Foy th. e futut  relatlonShlp between the E{J anti
   its Central and Eastern neighbeurs, $ee Wessels
  (}995).
5. lleiim nn (198?), pp.25-26. - -
6. I?er the dispute evef tihe Maa$tricht 'Yreat}t iu
  France, see geiimaRn (l995a, Chap. I3〉, Keff-
   maa i (lg95b〉. '
-7. As llat-i'raann- (l-995' b, p. 25g) sttnimafizes.!t,
   {{The ???t- de-s.is-egft spectucie eS- a French seeie4,
   l2i3-I ls partly `eRrepeani:edi thaEiks te a slRgle
   Eurepean marl{ee, et' a' PRij.S.g'eeS Pyeegss tkat
  reti t iRs en.tirely iiteRcli, ei a stste with diStinc-
   tlve nstit.utle ts aRd pfacilces i}u.t yeeuced
   pQwefs, -andi" ost ag- ggihryefila semetiEttes
   catateRlc g(grepea.R sg{Per--slale wltlt aveas cEt'
  iut!sdi-cti-Qg- evey Fg3nL-e is ceytaiR}y. baygqpe
  ep-eugk te b3£iie Cagtesian mlntis, aia}2Te;s el'
   Fren(Si geydeas, 3.iie clfts$ieal fae' ee}stsL" i et
   the 3spects et' t' he eges}efi ef itatieRal idieRtlUs i-u-
   F. i3't ce, see Fl¥'fta (lggX-, $a'aia'aitggE;〉. S}ama
---ge-･-
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   (1995).
 8. Harbermas (1995) considers the meaning of
   "being European" in terms of citizen$hip.
 9. Mayall & Miall (1994), pp. 262-263.
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